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Abstract
Suppose a set of requests arrives online: each request gives some value vi if accepted, but requires using
some amount of each of d resources. Our cost is a convex function of the vector of total utilization of these
d resources. Which requests should be accept to maximize our profit, i.e., the sum of values of the accepted
demands, minus the convex cost?
We consider this problem in the random-order a.k.a. secretary model, and show an O(d)-competitive
algorithm for the case where the convex cost function is also supermodular. If the set of accepted demands
must also be independent in a given matroid, we give an O(d3α)-competitive algorithm for the supermodular
case, and an improved O(d2α) if the convex cost function is also separable. Here α is the competitive ratio of
the best algorithm for the submodular secretary problem. These extend and improve previous results known
for this problem. Our techniques are simple but use powerful ideas from convex duality, which give clean
interpretations of existing work, and allow us to give the extensions and improvements.
1 Introduction
The problem we consider is a basic convex optimization problem in the online setting: n items appear one-by-
one. Each item/element e has a d-dimensional size s(e) ∈ Rd+ and a value v(e) ∈ R+, which are both revealed to
us when the item arrives.We must either accept or reject an item when it arrives, before seeing the future items. If
we accept a certain subsetA ⊆ [n] of the items, we get their total value v(A) := ∑e∈A ve, but incur a production
cost g(s(A)) := g(
∑
e∈A s(e)), where g : Rd+ → R+ is a non-decreasing convex cost function with g(0) = 0.
Optionally, we may also be given a downwards-closed family of subsets F ⊆ 2[n], and now the accepted set of
elements A must lie inF . More formally, we want to solve
max
A∈F
profit pi(A) :=
[
v(A)− g(s(A))]. (1.1)
This question arises, e.g., when we are selling some service that depends on d commodities, where the value is the
amount of money customer e is willing to pay for the service, and the size vector s(e) is the amount of resources
she will require. The cost function g(·) captures our operating expenses; its convexity models diseconomies
of scale that arise when dealing with scarce commodities. In particular, it can capture d-dimensional knapsack
constraints, by setting g(z) = 0 until the knapsack size, and ∞ afterwards. When the cost function is linear
g(z) = 〈a, z〉, we want to pick a max-weight subset from F using item weights v(e) − 〈a, s(e)〉, which is
tractable/approximable forF being a matroid, p-system, etc.
Blum et al. [BGMS11] defined this problem in the adversarial model, and gave posted-price algorithms for
“low-degree” separable cost functions g, that is, of the form g(z) =
∑d
i=1 gi(zi) for 1-dimensional functions
gi’s. This result was tightened by Huang and Kim [HK15], still for separable functions with additonal growth
control. More recently, Azar et al. [ABC+16] studied this problem for more general supermodular non-separable
convex functions g (see also [EF16]). A differentiable function g is supermodular if for any vectors x ≤ x′ we
∗This work was done in part while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
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have ∇g(x) ≤ ∇g(x′). Equivalently, if g is twice-differentiable, it is supermodular if ∂2g∂xi∂xj ≥ 0 for all i 6= j,
i.e., increasing the consumption of a resource cannot decrease the marginal cost for another. However, to handle
the worst-case ordering, Azar et al. also require the cost functions to have essentially low-degree.
Can we do better by going beyond the worst-case model? In this paper, we focus on the random-order or
“secretary” setting, where the set of items is fixed by an adversary but they arrive in random order. In the single-
dimensional case d = 1, it is easy to see that a solution that learns a “good” threshold λ and picks all further
items with density v(e)/s(e) at least λ essentially gives a constant approximation, much like in the secretary
and knapsack secretary problems [Fre83, BIKK07]. The multi-dimensional case is much more challenging. This
was studied by Barman et al. [BUCM12], again assuming a separable cost function g(z) =
∑d
i=1 gi(zi). They
give an O(d)-competitive algorithm for the unconstrained case, and an O(d5α)-competitive algorithm for the
problem with a downward closed constraint setF , where α is the competitive ratio for theF -secretary problem.
Their main idea is to perform a clever decomposition of the value of each item into “subvalues” vi(e) for each
of the coordinate cost functions gi’s; this effectively decomposes the problem into d 1-dimension problems with
values vi’s and costs gi’s. Unfortunately, since their solution explicitly relies on the decomposability of the cost
function, it is unclear how to extend it to general supermodular functions. We note that when the cost function
is supermodular, the profit function is a submodular set function (Section 2.1). However, the profit can take
negative values, and then existing algorithms for submodular maximization break down.1
Our work is then motivated by trying to better understand the multi-dimensional nature of this problem, and
provide a more principled algorithmic approach.
1.1 Our Results
We use techniques from convex duality to re-interpret, simplify, and improve the existing results. First, we obtain
the first approximation for non-separable supermodular cost functions. (We omit some mild regularity conditions
for brevity; see Section 3 for full details.)
Theorem 1.1 (Unconstrained & Supermodular). For the unconstrained problem with supermodular convex cost
functions g, we give an O(d)-competitive randomized algorithm in the random-order model.
This result generalizes the O(d)-approximation of Barman et al. [BUCM12] to the non-separable case. The
factor d seems unavoidable, since our problem inherits the (offline) Ω(d1−ε) hardness of the d-dimensional
knapsack, assuming NP 6= ZPP [DGV05].
Next, we consider the constrained case. For simplicity, we focus on the most interesting case where F is a
matroid constraint; more general results can be obtained from the results and techniques in Section 5.
Theorem 1.2 (Constrained & Separable). For the constrained problem with F being a matroid constraint,
and the cost function g being separable, we get an O(d2 log log rank)-competitive randomized algorithm in the
random-order model.
This improves by a factor of d3 the O(d5 log log rank)-approximation given by [BUCM12]. Finally, we give
a general reduction that takes an algorithm for separable functions and produces an algorithm for supermodular
functions, both with respect to a matroid constraint. This implies:
Theorem 1.3 (Constrained & Supermodular). For the constrained problem with F being a matroid constraint,
and the cost function g being supermodular, we get an O(d3 log log rank)-competitive randomized algorithm in
the random-order model.
1For example, we can model set packing (which is Ω(
√
# sets)-hard) as follows: for a subcollection S of sets, let pi(S) = |⋃S∈S S|−∑
S∈S(|S| − 1). The function pi is submodular, and its maximizer is a largest set packing.
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On conceptual contributions are in bringing techniques from convex duality to obtain, in a principled way,
threshold-based algorithms for non-linear secretary problems. Since this is a classical and heavily used algorith-
mic strategy for secretary problems [Fre83, BIKK07, Kle05, AWY14, MR14] we hope that the perspectives used
here will find use in other contexts.
1.2 Other Related Work
There is a vast literature on secretary problems [Fre83]. Closest to our setting, Agrawal and Devanur study
an online convex optimization problem in the random order model, and give a powerful result showing strong
regret bounds in this setting [AD15]. They extend this result to give algorithms for online packing LPs with
“large” right-hand sides. However, it is unclear how to use their algorithm to obtain results in our setting. Other
algorithms solving packing LPs with large right-hand sides appear in [AWY14, DJSW11, MR14, KRTV14,
GM16, ESF14].
Feldman and Zenklusen [FZ15] show how to transform any algorithm for (linear) matroid secretary into
one for submodular matroid secretary. They give an O(log log rank)-algorithm for the latter, based on results
of [Lac14, FSZ15]. All these algorithms critically assume the submodular function is non-negative everywhere,
which is not the case for us, since picking too large a set may cause the profit function to go negative. Indeed, one
technical contribution is a procedure for making the profit function non-negative while preserving submodularity
(Section 4.1), which allows us to use these results as part of our solution.
1.3 Structure of the paper
Section 3 develops the convex duality perspective used in the paper for the offline version of the unconstrained
case, hopefully in an manner accessible to non-experts. Section 4 gives the small changes required to extend
this to the constrained case. Section 5 shows how transform these into online algorithms. Section 6 shows how
to convert an algorithm for separable functions into one for supermodular functions, both subject to matroid
constraints. To improve the presentation, we make throughout convenient assumptions, which are discharged in
Appendix C.
Since some familiarity with convex functions and conjugates will be useful, we give basic facts about them
and some probabilistic inequalities in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
Problem Formulation. Elements from a universe U of size n are presented in random order. Each element e
has value v(e) ∈ R+ and size s(e) ∈ Rd+. We are given a convex cost function g : Rd+ → R+. On seeing each
element we must either accept or discard it. A downwards-closed collection F ⊆ 2U of feasible sets is also
given. When F = 2U , we call it the unconstrained problem. The goal is to pick a subset A ∈ F to maximize
the profit
pi(A) :=
∑
e∈A
v(e)− g(∑
e∈A
s(e)
)
. (2.2)
We often use vectors in {0, 1}n to denote subsets of U ; χA denotes the indicator vector for set A. Hence,
F ⊆ {0, 1}n is a down-ideal on the Boolean lattice, and we can succinctly write our problem as
max
x∈F
pi(x) := 〈v, x〉 − g(Sx), (2.3)
where columns of S ∈ Rd×n are the item sizes. Let opt denote the optimal value. For a subset A ⊆ U , v(A) and
s(A) denote
∑
e∈A v(e) = 〈v, χA〉 and
∑
e∈A s(e) = SχA respectively.
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Definition 2.1 (Exceptional). Item e ∈ U is exceptional if arg maxθ∈[0,1]
{
θ v(e)− g(θ s(e))} ∈ (0, 1).
Definition 2.2 (Marginal Function). Given g : Rd → R, define the ith marginal function gi : R → R as
gi(x) := g(xei), where ei is the ith standard unit vector.
2.1 Supermodular Functions
While supermodular functions defined over the Boolean lattice are widely considered, one can define supermod-
ularity for all real-valued functions. Omitted proofs are presented in Appendix B.1
Definition 2.3 (Supermodular). Let X ⊆ Rd be a lattice. A function f : X → R is supermodular if for all
x, y ∈ X , f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x ∧ y) + f(x ∨ y), where x ∧ y and x ∨ y are the component-wise minimum and
maximum operations.
This corresponds to the usual definition of (discrete) supermodularity when X = {0, 1}d. For proof of the
lemma below and other equivalent definitions, see, e.g., [Top98].
Lemma 2.4 (Supermodularity and Gradients). A convex function f : Rd+ → R is supermodular if and only if any
of the following are true.
• ∇f is increasing in each coordinate, if f is differentiable.
• ∂2f(x)∂xi∂xj ≥ 0 for all i, j, if f is twice-differentiable.
Lemma 2.5 (Superadditivity). If f : Rd+ → R is differentiable, convex, and supermodular, then for x, x′, y ∈ Rd+
such that x′ ≤ x, f(x′ + y) − f(x′) ≤ f(x + y) − f(x). In particular, if f(0) = 0, setting x′ = 0 gives
f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x+ y).
Corollary 2.6 (Subadditivity of profit). The profit function pi is subadditive.
The next fact shows that the cost g is also supermodular when seen in a discrete way.
Fact 2.7 (Continuous vs. Discrete Supermodularity). Given a convex supermodular function g : Rd → R and n
items with sizes s1, . . . , sn ∈ Rd+, define the function h : {0, 1}n → R as h(v) = g(
∑
i sivi) = g(Sv). Then
h(·) is a (discrete) supermodular function.
3 The Offline Unconstrained Problem
We first present an offline algorithm for supermodular functions in the unconstrained case (whereF = {0, 1}n).
We focus on the main techniques and defer some technicalities and all computational aspects for now. Just for
this section, we assume item sizes are “infinitesimal”. We make the following assumptions on the cost function
g and the elements.
Assumption 3.1. We assume that cost function g is non-negative, strictly convex, closed, and differentiable. We
assume g(0) = 0, g is supermodular, and that gradients of g go to∞ along every positive direction. We assume
elements are in general position2, and that there are no exceptional items. We also assume that every individual
item has profit at most M := opt/ηd for η ≥ 104. (See Section C.2 on how to remove these assumptions on
elements.)
Classifiers. The offline algorithm will be based on linear classifiers, where a set of weights is used to aggregates
the multidimensional size of an item into a scalar, and the algorithm picks all items that have high-enough
value/aggregated-size ratio.
2There are no non-trivial linear dependencies, see Lemma C.2 for a formal definition
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Definition 3.2 (Classifiers and Occupancy). Given a vector λ ∈ Rd+ (a “classifier”), define the set of items
picked by λ as Uλ := {e ∈ U | v(e) ≥ 〈λ, s(e)〉}. Let occλ :=
∑
e:v(e)≥〈λ,s(e)〉 s(e) denote the multidimensional
occupancy induced by choosing items in Uλ.
To understand the importance of classifier-based solutions it is instructive to consider the problem with single-
dimensional size. A little thought shows that an optimal solution is to pick items in decreasing order of value
density v(e)/s(e). Adding these items causes the total occupancy—and hence the incurred cost—to increase, so
we stop when the value density of the current item becomes smaller than the derivative of the cost function at the
current utilization. That is, we find a density threshold λ such that g′(total size of items having v(e) ≥ λ s(e)) ≈
λ, and take all these high-density items. Thus, the optimal solution is one based on the classifier λ.
To see that this holds in the multi-dimensional case, express g in terms of linearizations
g(z) = max
λ∈Rd+
(〈λ, z〉 − g?(λ)), (3.4)
where g? is its Fenchel dual. (Note we are maximizing over positive classifiers; Lemma C.1 shows this is
WLOG.) Then our unconstrained problem (2.2) becomes a minimax problem:
max
x∈{0,1}n
min
λ∈Rd+
[
〈v, x〉 −
(
〈λ, Sx〉 − g?(λ)
)]
.
Consider an optimal pair (x∗, λ∗); i.e., a pair that is a saddle-point solution, so neither x∗ nor λ∗ can be
improved keeping the other one fixed. This saddle-point optimality implies:
(a) Since λ∗ = argmaxλ∈Rd+(〈λ, Sx
∗〉−g?(λ)), it is the right linearization of g at Sx∗ and thus λ∗ = ∇g(Sx∗)
(see Claim A.3).
(b) x∗ is such that x∗i = 1 if vi > 〈λ∗, Si〉 and x∗i = 0 if vi < 〈λ∗, Si〉, with Si being the ith column of S and
the size of the ith item.
From part (b) we see that the optimal solution x∗ is essentially the one picked by the classifier λ∗ (ignoring
coordinates with the “0 marginal value” vi = 〈λ∗, Si〉). Moreover, the converse also holds.
Claim 3.3. For a classifier λ ∈ Rd+, let x be the items picked by it. If we have λ = ∇g(Sx)
def
= ∇g(occλ), then
x is an optimal solution.
Proof. For any solution x′,
pi(x′) = 〈v, x′〉 − g(Sx′) ≤ 〈v, x′〉 − 〈λ, Sx′〉+ g?(λ)
≤ 〈v, x〉 − 〈λ, Sx〉+ g?(λ) (λ=∇g(Sx))= 〈v, x〉 − g(Sx) = pi(x),
where the second inequality holds since, by definition, x maximizes 〈v, x〉 − 〈λ, Sx〉.
Restricting the Set of Classifiers. The existence of such good classifiers is not enough, since we need to find
them online. This is difficult not only because of d degrees of freedom and no control over the magnitude of the
values/sizes (to be exploited in concentration inequalities), but also because picking too few or too many items
could lead to low profits.
So we restrict the set of candidate classifiers to be a monotone31-dimensional curve C ⊆ Rd+, satisfying
additional properties given below. The main motivation is that it imposes a total ordering on the set of items
3A curve C is monotone if for every pair λ, λ′ ∈ C, one is coordinate-wise smaller than the other.
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picked by the classifiers: given λ ≤ µ on such a curve C, the sets of items picked satisfy the inclusion Uλ ⊇ Uµ.
This allows us to select a “minimally good” classifier in C in a robust way, avoiding classifiers that select too
many items.
To design the curve C so it contains a classifier with profit ≈ optd , we relax the condition∇g(occλ) = λ from
Claim 3.3 (too much to ask) and require the existence of λ ∈ C satisfying:
(P1) (don’t pick too many items)∇g(occλ) ≤ λ.
(P2) (partial gradient equality) There is a coordinate i∗ where (∇g(occλ))i∗ = λi∗ .
(P3) (balanced curve) g?i (λi) = g
?
j (λj) ∀i, j ∈ [d] (see also Claim A.6).
Property (P1) enforces half of the equality in Claim 3.3, and (P2) guarantees that equality holds for some
coordinate. Now for property (P3). Since λ 6= ∇g(occλ) the optimality proof of Claim 3.3 does not go though,
since g(occλ) 6= 〈λ, occλ〉 − g?(λ). As we prove later, the difference between these terms can be at most g?(λ)
(see Figure .1 for an illustration), and the superadditivity of g gives us g?(λ) ≤ ∑i g?i (λi) (see Claim A.7).
Property (P3) is used to control this sum, by charging it to the coordinate i∗ where we know we have “the right
linearization” (by property (P2)). Reinterpreting the construction of [BUCM12] in our setting, we then define C
as any monotone curve where every λ ∈ C satisfies (P3).
Lemma 3.4. The curve C exists and contains a λ satisfying properties (P1)-(P3).
Proof. We first show existence, that is, the set {λ ∈ Rd+ | g?i (λi) = g?j (λj) ∀i, j} contains a monotone curve.
Notice that this set is the union of the box {λ ∈ Rd+ | g?i (λi) = 0 ∀i} =
∏
i[0, g
′
i(0)] (range of slopes where we
can swivel around gi(0) = 0) and a monotone curve {λ(τ) | τ > 0}, where λ(τ) is the unique vector satisfying
g?i (λi(τ)) = τ ; uniqueness follows from the fact g
?
i stays at value zero in the interval [0, g
′
i(0)], but after that
is strictly increasing due to its convexity, and monotonicity of this curve also follows from monotonicity of the
g?i ’s. Thus, C is this curve plus any monotone curve extending it to the origin.
To see that C satisfies properties (P1) and (P2), we note that since the g?i ’s are increasing and not identically
0, C is unbounded in all coordinates. Thus, a sufficiently large λ ∈ C satisfies (P1), and we can start with such λ
and move down the curve (decreasing in each coordinate) until we obtain λ′ ∈ C with λ′ = ∇g(occλ′), since the
g has increasing gradients. (The equality in this final step uses the assumption that item sizes are infinitesimal,
which we made for simplicity in this section).
Making the above discussion formal, we show that C has a high-value classifier. Recall that Uλ is the set of
items picked by λ (Definition 3.2).
Theorem 3.5. Given Assumption 3.1, let λ∗ be a classifier in C satisfying properties (P1)-(P3). Then for all
x′ ∈ [0, 1]n we have pi(Uλ∗) ≥ 1d+1 · pi(x′).
Proof. Let x∗ = χU∗λ be the solution picked by the classifier λ
∗, and note that occλ∗ = Sx∗. Let L(y, µ) :=
〈v, y〉 − [〈µ, Sy〉 − g?(µ)] be the linearization of pi(y) at some slope µ. From (3.4) we know g(y) ≥ L(y, µ) for
all µ ≥ 0. Since x∗ is optimal for the linearization L(y, λ∗) (because x∗i = 1 iff vi − 〈λ∗, Si〉 ≥ 0), we have
L(x∗, λ∗) ≥ L(x′, λ∗) ≥ pi(x′) for all x′ ∈ [0, 1]n. (3.5)
Now we relate the true profit pi(x∗) to this linearized value. Observe that
pi(x∗) = 〈v, x∗〉 − g(Sx∗) = 〈v, x∗〉 − [〈∇g(Sx∗), Sx∗〉 − g?(∇g(Sx∗))] (by Claim A.2)
≥ 〈v, x∗〉 − 〈λ∗, Sx∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ g?(∇g(Sx∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
, (3.6)
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where the inequality uses that λ∗ ≥ ∇g(Sx∗) by property (P1) and Sx∗ ≥ 0. The first term is non-negative
because we only pick items for which vi − 〈λ, Si〉 ≥ 0. The second term is non-negative due to Claim A.5(a).
We can now prove three lemmas that imply the theorem.
Lemma 3.6. For any x′ ∈ [0, 1]n, pi(x∗) ≥ L(x∗, λ∗)− g?(λ∗) ≥ pi(x′)− g?(λ∗).
Proof. Drop the second term from (3.6), then use the definition of L(·, ·) and (3.5). 
Lemma 3.7. g?(λ∗) ≤ d · g?i∗(λ∗i∗).
Proof. Using the superadditivity of g and Claim A.7 we get g?(λ∗) ≤ ∑i g?i (λ∗i ). Now from property (P3) of
the classifier λ∗, all the terms in the sum are equal. 
Lemma 3.8. pi(x∗) ≥ g?i∗(λ∗i∗).
Proof. We claim that g?(∇g(Sx∗)) ≥ g?i∗(λ∗i∗); plugging this into (3.6) proves the lemma. For the claim, define
λ′ = ∇g(Sx∗). By Property (P2), λ′i∗ = λ∗i∗ , so we want to show g?(λ′) ≥ g?i∗(λ′i∗) = g?(λ′i∗ei∗). This follows
because g? is monotone (Claim A.5(b)). 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.5.
4 The Offline Constrained Case
Having built up tools and intuition in the unconstrained case, we turn to the case where there is a downwards-
closed constraint F ⊆ {0, 1}n, and the goal is to maximize the profit subject to x ∈ F . We again work with
Assumption 3.1, but do not assume anything about items sizes. We discuss computational aspects at the end of
this section.
The general idea is again to use classifiers λ ∈ Rd+, and only consider items in Uλ, namely those with “high-
enough” value vi ≥ 〈λ, Si〉. However, because of the constraints F we may no longer be able to pick all these
items. Thus, we need to consider the most profitable solution from F in this filtered feasible set Uλ (whose
quality is less clear how to analyze).
Again we restrict to the 1-dimensional curve C defined in the previous section; however, it only satisfies
slightly modified versions of properties (P1)-(P2), since we do not assume the item sizes to be infinitesimal
anymore. To make this precise, define the “open” set U
◦
λ := {e ∈ U | v(e) > 〈λ, s(e)〉}; note the strict
inequality. Under the assumption of items being in general position, there is at most one “threshold” item with
vi = 〈λ, Si〉, i.e., |Uλ \ U ◦λ | ≤ 1. Now a “good” classifier is one that satisfies the following:
(P1’) For all binary x with support(x) ⊆ U ◦λ and x ∈ F , ∇g(Sx) ≤ λ.
(P2’) There exists a binary xocc with support(xocc) ⊆ Uλ and xocc ∈ F , and index i∗ such that (∇g(Sxocc))i∗ ≥
λi∗ . (Note that if support(xocc) ⊆ U ◦λ , then by property (P1’) the above inequality holds at equality; else
xocc contains the unique element in Uλ \ U ◦λ .)
(P3’) This is the same as before: g?i (λi) = g
?
j (λj) ∀i, j ∈ [d].
The arguments of Lemma 3.4 show the following.
Lemma 4.1. Given Assumption 3.1, the curve C defined in the previous section contains a λ satisfying properties
(P1’)-(P3’).
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Next, we show that for a good classifier λ ∈ C, the maximum profit solution from F contained within U ◦λ
essentially gives an O(1/d)-approximation.
Theorem 4.2 (Offline Approach). Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Let λ∗ be a classifier in C satisfying proper-
ties (P1’)–(P3’). Then the better of the two solutions: (a) the maximum profit solution inF containing elements
only from U
◦
λ∗ , and (b) the optimal single element in Uλ∗ , has profit at least pi(x
′)/(2d + 1) for any vector
x′ ∈ Conv(F ) ⊆ [0, 1]n.
Proof. The idea is to follow the development in Theorem 3.5. There same solution x∗ satisfied the value lower
bounds of Lemmas 3.6 and 3.8; to satisfy the first lemma, we needed the solution to be optimal for the lineariza-
tion of pi using “slope” λ∗; to satisfy the second, we needed to satisfy (P2). Here, we construct two solutions in
F intersect Uλ∗ to satisfy these lemmas separately:
xlin := argmax{〈v, y〉 − 〈λ∗, Sy〉 | y ⊆ U ◦λ∗ , y ∈ F}
xocc := the solution promised by property (P2’).
Since property (P1’) and (P3’) holds for xlin, Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 hold essentially unchanged, and thus for
any vector x′ ∈ Conv(F ) we have
pi(xlin) ≥ pi(x′)− d · g?i∗(λ∗i∗). (4.7)
The solution xocc may not belong to the set U
◦
λ∗ , since it may contain the threshold item e
◦ = 〈λ∗, s(e◦)〉, if
it exists (let x◦ = χ{e◦} be its characteristic vector, all 0’s vector if does not exists). Let xrest = xocc − x◦.
Lemma 4.3. These solutions satisfy pi(xrest) + pi(x◦) ≥ g?i∗(λ∗i∗).
Proof. Property (P1’) gives ∇g(Sxrest) ≤ λ∗, and Property (P2’) implies ∇g(S(xrest + x◦)) = ∇g(Sxocc)
is at least λ∗ at some coordinate i∗. Since g is convex and differentiable, the gradients are continuous [HUL01,
Remark D.6.2.6], so there is δ ∈ [0, 1] where the vector x̂ := xrest+δx◦ satisfies∇g(Sx̂) ≤ λ∗ and∇g(Sx̂)i∗ =
λ∗i∗ for some coordinate i
∗. Due to these properties, the proof of Lemma 3.8 holds for x̂ and shows pi(x̂) ≥
g?i∗(λ
∗
i∗).
The assumption of no exceptional items gives pi(δx◦) ≤ pi(x◦). From subadditivity of profit pi, g?i∗(λ∗i∗) ≤
pi(x̂) ≤ pi(xrest) + pi(δx◦) ≤ pi(xrest) + pi(x◦). This concludes the proof. 
Combining Lemma 4.3 with inequality (4.7), for any x′ ∈ F we have
pi(x′) ≤ pi(xlin) + d pi(xrest) + d pi(x◦).
Since xlin, xrest are feasible for problem (a) in the theorem statement, and x◦ is feasible for problem (b), the best
of them gives a (2d+ 1)-approximation. This proves Theorem 4.2.
Picking the most profitable singleton is trivial offline, and well-approximable online by the secretary algo-
rithm [Fre83]. Moreover, we need to approximately optimize the submodular function pi (Fact 2.7) over F |U◦
λ∗
(i.e., the sets in F with only elements of U
◦
λ∗). For several constraint structures (e.g., matroids, p-systems),
there are known algorithms for approximately optimizing non-negative (and sometimes also monotone) sub-
modular functions. Unfortunately, our profit function pi may take negative values, so we cannot directly use
these algorithms. Simply considering the truncated function max{pi(z), 0} does not work because it may be
non-submodular. In the next section, when g is separable, we introduce a way of making our profit function
non-negative everywhere, while maintaining submodularity and preserving the values at the region of interest
F |U◦
λ∗
.
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4.1 Making the Profit Function pi Non-negative
We first show that pi already satisfies the desired properties over the sets inF |U◦
λ∗
.
Lemma 4.4. The profit function pi is non-negative monotone overF |U◦
λ∗
.
Proof. Since pi(∅) = 0 it suffices to show monotonicity. Consider x ∈ F |U◦
λ∗
and let χe be the indicator os an
item in x. Comparing the costs with and without e we have
g(Sx)
(convexity)
≤ g(S(x− χe)) + 〈∇g(Sx), Sχe〉
(Property (P1’))
≤ g(S(x− χe)) + 〈λ∗, s(e)〉.
Since x ∈ U ◦λ∗ , we have v(e) > 〈λ∗, s(e)〉 and thus pi(x) > pi(x− χe), i.e., monotonicity.
However, to run algorithms that approximately optimize pi overF |U◦
λ∗
in a black-box fashion, non-negativity
over the feasible setsF |U◦
λ∗
is not enough, even if the algorithm only probes pi over these sets, since their proof of
correctness may require this property outside of feasible sets. Thus, we need to modify pi to ensure non-negativity
outside ofF |U◦
λ∗
.
For that, the idea is to truncate the gradient of the cost g so ∇g(Sx) becomes at most λ∗ for all subsets
x ⊆ U ◦λ∗ (i.e., so Property (P1’) holds for all subsets); this was the crucial element for the monotonicity (and
hence non-negativity) proof above. Notice that since Property (P1’) guarantees already ∇g(Sx) ≤ λ∗ for all
x ∈ F |U◦
λ∗
, this does not change the value of pi over these points. The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix
B.
Lemma 4.5. If g is separable, there is a submodular function pi+ satisfying the following:
i. pi+ is non-negative and monotone over all subsets of U
◦
λ∗ , and
ii. pi+(x) = pi(x) for every x ∈ F |U◦
λ∗
.
4.2 The Offline Algorithm: Wrap-up
Using this non-negativization procedure, we get an O(d)-approximation offline algorithm for constrained profit
maximization for separable cost functions g; this is an offline analog of Theorem 1.2. For the unconstrained
case, Lemma 4.4 implies that the profit function pi it itself monotone, so we get an O(d)-approximation offline
algorithm for the supermodular case. In the next section we show how to convert these algorithms into online
algorithms.
One issue we have not discussed is the computational cost of finding λ∗ satisfying (P1’)–(P3’). In the full
version of the paper, we show that for any ε > 0 we can efficiently find a λ∗ satisfying (P1’), (P2’), and a slightly
weaker condition: |g?i (λ∗i ) − g?j (λ∗j )| ≤ 2ε for all i, j ∈ [d]. Using this condition in Theorem 4.2 means we
get a profit of at least opt−2dε2d+1 ≥ [opt/(2d+1)] − ε; the running time depends on log ε−1 so we can make this loss
negligible.
5 The Online Algorithm
In the previous sections we were working offline: in particular, in computing the “good” classifier λ ∈ C,
we assumed knowledge of the entire element set. We now present the online framework for the setting where
elements come in random order. Recall the definition of the curve C from §3, and the fact that there is a total
order among all λ ∈ C. Recall that for simplicity we restrict the constraintsF to be matroid constraints.
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For a subset of elements A ⊆ U , let opt(A) and fopt(A) denote the integer and fractional optimal profit
for F |A, the feasible solutions restricted to elements in A. Note that in the fractional case this means the best
solution in the convex hull Conv(F |A). Clearly, fopt(A) ≥ opt(A). We use opt and fopt to denote opt(U) and
fopt(U) for the entire instance U .
Again we work under Assumption 3.1. We will also make use of any algorithm for maximizing submodular
functions overF in the random-order model satisfying the following.
Assumption 5.1. Algorithm SubmodMS takes a nonnegative monotone submodular function f with f(∅) = 0,
and a number N . When run on a sequence X of N elements presented in random order, it returns a (random)
subset Xalg ∈ F with expected value E[f(Xalg)] ≥ 1α maxX′∈F f(X). Moreover, the it only evaluates the
function f on feasible sets.
Our algorithm is very simple:
Algorithm 5.1 Online Algorithm for Profit Maximization
1: L← first Binomial(n, 1/2) items.
2: µ← largest vector on curve C s.t. fopt(Lµ) ≥ 112d fopt(L).
3: R← remaining instance, namely the last n− |L| items.
4: R◦µ ← {e ∈ R | v(e) > 〈µ, s(e)〉} be the (strictly) “filtered” remaining instance.
5: Un-constrained: Select items in R◦µ not decreasing the current value of the solution.
Constrained: Run algorithm SubmodMS on R◦µ using the profit function pi, selecting items according to this algo-
rithm. However, do not add any items that decrease the current value of the solution.
Note that Lµ denotes the set of items in the sample L picked by µ (Definition 3.2). In Step 2, we can use
the Ellipsoid method to find fopt, i.e., to maximize the concave profit function pi over the matroid polytopes
Conv(F |Lµ) and Conv(F |L), within negligible error. Moreover, we must do this for several sets Lµ and pick
the largest one on C using a binary-search procedure. We defer the technical details to the full version of the
paper.
5.1 Analysis
To analyze the algorithm, we need to show that the classifier µ learned in Step 2 is large enough that we do not
waste space with useless items, but low enough that we admit enough useful items. Along the way we frequently
use the concentration bound from Fact A.9. For this we need the profit function pi to satisfy a Lipschitz-type
condition (A.10) on the optimal solutions of any given sub-instance. To facilitate this, let us record a useful
lemma, proved in Appendix B. For a vector y ∈ Rn, and a subset A ⊆ U , define yA to be the same as y on A,
and zero outside A.
Claim 5.2. Consider any U ′ ⊆ U , and let y be an optimal fractional solution on F |U ′ (so pi(y) = fopt(U ′)).
Then for any B ⊆ A ⊆ U ′ with |A \ B| = 1, we have |pi(yA) − pi(yB)| ≤ M , where M is an upper bound on
the profit from any single item.
From Section 4, recall λ∗ ∈ Rd+ is a classifier that satisfies properties (P1’)–(P3’).
Lemma 5.3 (Goldilocks Lemma). Given Assumption 3.1, the classifier µ computed in Line 2 of Algorithm 5.1
satisfies:
(a) (Not too small) µ ≥ λ∗, with probability at least 19/20.
(b) (Not too big) fopt(Uµ) ≥ fopt48d with probability at least 1− 1/20d ≥ 19/20.
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Proof sketch. (See Appendix B for full proof.) For the first part, we show that the classifier λ∗ satisfies the
properties needed in Line 2 with probability 1 − 1/20; since µ is the largest such vector, we get µ ≥ λ∗. Using
Theorem 4.2 and the assumption that no item has large profit, we have fopt(Uλ∗) ≥ fopt3d . Moreover, the sample
obtains at least half of this profit in expectation, i.e., E fopt(Lλ∗) ≥ fopt3d . Then using concentration (Fact A.9)
with the Lipschitz property of Claim 5.2 and the no-high-profit-item assumption, we have fopt(Lλ∗) ≥ fopt12d
(which is at least fopt(L)12d ) with probability at least 19/20. Thus, with this probability λ
∗ satisfies the properties
needed in Line 2 of the algorithm, as desired.
For the part (b) of the lemma, notice that for each scenario fopt(Uµ) ≥ fopt(Lµ), since feasible solutions for
the sample are feasible for the whole instance. Next, by definition of µ, fopt(Lµ) ≥ fopt(L)12d . Finally, if x is the
fractional optimal solution on U with pi(x) = fopt, then E[pi(xL)] ≥ fopt/2, since g is super-additive. Again
using the concentration bound Fact A.9, the profit pi(xL) is at least
fopt
4 with probability at least (1 − 1/20d). Of
course, fopt(L) ≥ pi(xL). Chaining these inequalities, fopt(Uµ) ≥ fopt48d with this probability.
In view of Theorem 4.2, we show the filtered out-of-sample instance R◦µ behaves like U
◦
λ∗ .
Lemma 5.4. The filtered out-of-sample instance R◦µ satisfies the following w.p. 19/20:
(a) For all e ∈ R◦µ, v(e) ≥ 〈λ∗, s(e)〉.
(b) For all x with support(x) ⊆ R◦µ such that x ∈ F ,∇g(Sx) ≤ λ∗.
(c) fopt(R◦µ) ≥ fopt200d .
Proof. By Lemma 5.3(a), threshold µ ≥ λ∗ with probability 19/20. When that happens, U ◦µ ⊆ U
◦
λ∗ . Since the
first two properties hold for U
◦
λ∗ , they also hold for U
◦
µ , and by downward-closedness, also for R
◦
µ.
For the third part, let λ+ be the largest threshold in C such that fopt(Uλ+) ≥ fopt48d . From Lemma 5.3(b),
with good probability we have µ ≤ λ+. Since µ is a smaller threshold, the instance Uλ+ is contained in the
instance Uµ, which implies that for every scenario fopt(Rµ) ≥ fopt(Rλ+). Next we will show that that with
good probability fopt(Rλ+) ≥ fopt200d , and hence get the same lower bound for fopt(Rµ). If y is the optimal
fractional solution for Uλ+ , then yR is feasible for Rλ+ with E[pi(yR)] = 12 fopt(Uλ+) ≥ fopt96d . Moreover,
using the concentration bound again, we get that pi(yR) ≥ fopt192d with probability at least 19/20. Finally, by the
assumption of general position, there is at most one item in Rµ \ R◦µ. Dropping this item from the solution y
to get y◦ reduces the value by at most M = fopt
104d
; here we use subadditivty of the profit, and that there are no
exceptional items. Hence, with probability at least 19/20:
fopt(R◦µ) ≥ fopt(R◦λ+) ≥ pi(y◦R) ≥
fopt
196d
−M ≥ fopt
200d
.
Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorems in the online setting.
Theorem 5.5 (Unconstrained Case: Supermodular Cost Functions). Algorithm 5.1 gives anO(d)-approximation
in expectation for the unconstrained case, if the cost function is supermodular.
Proof. Define the event E that Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 hold; Pr(E) ≥ 17/20. Now, by Lemma 5.4(c), the optimal
fractional solution for R◦µ has profit at least fopt/200d. Moreover, since there are no constraints, the profit
function is monotone submodular over all ofU◦λ∗ by Lemma 4.4. Conditioning on the good event E , Lemma 5.3(a)
gives that R◦µ ⊆ U◦λ∗ , so the algorithm to maximize the monotone submodular function (both integrally and
fractionally) is to pick all elements. Hence, conditioned on E , the profit we get is at least fopt/200d. In the other
case, we never pick an item that gives negative marginal value, so our solution is always non-negative. Hence
our expected profit is at least Pr[E ] · opt(Rµ) = Ω(fopt/d) ≥ Ω(opt/d).
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The analysis of the algorithm for the constrained separable-cost case is similar, only using the constrained
offline guarantees of Theorem 4.2, and the non-negativization Lemma 4.4 to argue that SubmodMS maintains
its guarantees. Details are provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 5.6 (Constrained Case: Separable Cost Functions). Suppose algorithm SubmodMS satisfies Assump-
tion 5.1 and is α-competitive in expectation. Then Algorithm 5.1 gives a O(αd2)-approximation in expectation.
6 Separability versus Supermodularity
In this section, we show that an β-approximation algorithm for the separable-cost case gives aO(dβ)-approximation
for a slight generalization of the supermodular-cost case. Consider the problem of picking a set A to solve
pi(A) := max
A∈F
(
v(A)− g(∑
e∈A
s(e)
))
,
where v(A) is a (discrete) submodular function over {0, 1}n with v(∅) = 0, g is a convex, (continuous) super-
modular function over Rd, andF is some downward-closed constraint set. We show that for the case of matroid
constraints, this problem can be reduced to the setting where the cost function is separable over its d coordinates,
suffering a loss of O(d).
Theorem 6.1 (Reduction). Given an β-approximation algorithm for profit-maximization for separable convex
cost functions under matroid constraints, we can get an d(β + 2ed)-approximation algorithm for the profit-
maximization problem with supermodular costs g, submodular values v, andF being a matroid constraint.
The reduction is the following:
1. Define separable costs g(y) := 1/d
∑d
i=1 gi(dyi), where gi are marginal functions for g.
2. W.p. p = ββ+2ed , run single-secretary algorithm to return element with maximum profit.
3. W.p. 1− p = 2edβ+ed , run algorithm for value function v(·) and separable cost fn. g(·).
This reduction relies on the following simple but perhaps surprising observation that relates separability with
supermodularity, which may find other applications.
Lemma 6.2. Given a monotone convex superadditive function g with g(0) = 0, let gi be the marginal functions.
Then for all y ∈ Rd+:
1. g(y) ≥∑i gi(yi)
2. g(y) ≤ 1d
∑
i gi(dyi) = g(y).
Proof. The first property follows from the superadditivity of g, and the second follows from Jensen’s inequality.
While the full proof of Theorem 6.1 is deferred to Appendix B, the main idea is clean. Given an optimal
integer solution x∗ for the original problem (with the original cost function), we use Lemma 6.2 and the Lova´sz
(convex) extension of submodular functions to show that x∗/d is a good fractional solution for the separable cost
function. Now using polyhedral properties of d-dimensional faces of the matroid polytope, and other properties
of the Lova´sz extension, we show the existence of a good integer solution to the separable problem. Combining
this reduction with Theorem 1.2 proves Theorem 1.3.
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Figure .1: The overshoot gap is upper bounded by g?(λ).
A Facts about Convex Functions and Useful Inequalities
A.1 Convex Functions
To avoid degenerate conditions, we assume that the convex cost functions g we consider are closed, not identically
+∞ and there is an affine function minorizing g on Rd.
Definition A.1 (Convex Dual). For any function g : Rd → R, its convex dual is the function g? : Rd → R given
by
g?(y) := sup
x
[〈y, x〉 − g(x)].
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Claim A.2 (Linearization). ([HUL01, Theorem E.1.4.1]) For every convex function g : Rd → R, any (sub)gradient
at the point x gives the “right linearization”:
g(x) = 〈x, u〉 − g?(u) ⇐⇒ u ∈ ∂g(x). (A.8)
Claim A.3 (Double Dual). ([HUL01, Corollary E.1.3.6]) Let g : Rd → R be a convex function. If its epigraph
{(x, r) ∈ Rd × R : r ≥ g(x)} is closed, then g?? = g.
Claim A.4 (Fenchel-Young Inequality). For every convex function g : Rd → R, linearizing using any vector
gives us an underestimate on the value of g:
g(x) ≥ 〈x, u〉 − g?(u). (A.9)
Claim A.5 (Dual Function Facts). Let g : Rd+ → R be a convex function on the positive orthant.
a. If g(0) = 0, then g?(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ.
b. If λ ≥ λ′ then g?(λ) ≥ g?(λ′).
c. g? is a closed convex function.
Proof. For property (a), g?(λ) ≥ 〈λ, 0〉 − g(0) = 0 using Claim A.4.
For property (b), take any x in Rd+ (the domain of g) and observe
〈λ, x〉 − g(x) ≥ 〈λ′, x〉 − g(x).
Take the supremum over all such x’s in the left-hand side and use Definition A.1 to get
g?(λ) ≥ 〈λ′, x〉 − g(x)
for all x ∈ Rd+. To complete the argument, take the supremum on the right-hand side.
For property (c), see [HUL01, Theorem E.1.1.2].
Claim A.6 (Duals and Marginals Commute). Given a monotone convex g : Rd → R, (g?)i(z) = (gi)?(z) for all
z ∈ R. I.e., the marginal of the dual is the same as the dual of the marginal.
Proof. (g?)i(z) = g?(zei) = maxx (〈zei, x〉 − g(x)) g increas.= maxxi (zxi − g(xiei)) = maxxi (zxi − gi(xi))
= (gi)
?(z). This means there are no concerns of ambiguity when we write g?i (z).
Claim A.7 (Subadditivity over Coordinates). Given a superadditive convex function g : Rd → R,
g?(λ) ≤
∑
i
g?i (λi) ∀λ.
Proof. From the definition of convex dual, we have
g?(λ) = max
x
(〈x, λ〉 − g(x)) ≤ max
x
(〈x, λ〉 −∑
i
gi(xi)
)
=
∑
i
max
xi
(xi λi − gi(xi)) =
∑
i
g?i (λi).
The inequality uses the superadditivity of g.
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A.2 Probabilistic inequalities
Fact A.8. Consider a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n and let X be the random vector obtained by setting each coordinate of
x to 0 with probability 1/2. If cost function g is supermodular then
E[pi(X)] ≥ 1
2
pi(x).
Proof. Function g is superadditive due to Lemma 2.5, and so pi is subadditive: pi(y+ z) ≤ pi(y) +pi(z). Writing
x = X + (x−X) and applying subadditivity, we get
pi(x) ≤ pi(X) + pi(x−X).
But X and x−X have the same distribution, so taking expectations gives 2E[pi(X)] ≥ pi(x).
Fact A.9. Consider a submodular function f : 2U → R. Consider a set Y ⊆ U such that f is non-negative over
all of its subsets and we also have the following Lipschitz condition for some M :
For all Y ′ ⊆ Y and element e ∈ Y ′, |f(Y ′)− f(Y ′ − e)| ≤M. (A.10)
Let Y be the random subset obtained from picking each element from Y independently with some probability
(which can be different for each item). Then
Pr(|f(Y)− E[f(Y)]| ≥ t) ≤ 2M E[f(Y)]
t2
(A.11)
Proof. Vondra´k showed thatM -Lipschitz non-negative submodular functions are weakly (2M,0)-self-bounding [Von10].
By the Efron-Stein inequality, such functions have Var(f(Y)) ≤ 2M E[f(Y)] [BLM13]. Now Chebychev’s in-
equality gives the result.
B Missing Proofs
B.1 Proofs for Section 2.1
Proof of Lemma 2.5. By integrating gradients we have
f(x′ + y)− f(x′) =
∫ 1
t=0
〈∇f(x′ + t y), y〉 dt ≤
∫ 1
t=0
〈∇f(x+ t y), y〉 dt = f(x+ y)− f(x),
where the inequality uses Lemma 2.4(1), the monotone gradients property.
Proof of Fact 2.7. Given x′ ≤ x in the Boolean cube and i not in x,
h(x′ + ei)− h(x′) = g(S(x′ + ei))− g(Sx′) ≤ g(S(x+ ei))− g(Sx) = h(x+ ei)− h(x),
where the inequality uses Lemma 2.5, and S ≥ 0.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Since g is separable, it has the form g(z) =
∑
i gi(zi). Thus, it will suffice to perform the gradient truncation on
each of the 1-dimensional functions gi, which is accomplished by the following lemma.
Claim B.1 (Gradient truncation). Given a 1-dimensional convex function f : R → R and a real value γ ∈ R+,
there is another function f+ : R→ R satisfying the following:
i. f+ is convex,
ii. For all z, all subgradients u ∈ ∂f+(z), and satisfy u ≤ γ.
iii. If z is such that some subgradient z ∈ ∂f(z) satisfies u ≤ γ, then f+(z) = f(z).
Proof. Define f+ as follows:
f+(z) = sup
u≤γ
[u · z − f?(u)] ;
notice the constraint u ≤ γ, and that the dual f? is the usual Fenchel dual for f . Properties (i) and (ii) follow
from the fact f+ is the point-wise supremum of linear functions with slopes at most γ.
For Property (iii), by the double dual property in Claim A.3, f(z) = supu[u · z− f?(u)], and hence f ≥ f+.
Moreover, take a point z such that some subgradient u ∈ ∂f(z) satisfies u ≤ γ. Then we have
f(z)
(Claim A.2)
= u · z − f?(u) ≤ sup
u≤λ∗
[u · z − f?(u)] (by defn.)= f+(z) ≤ f(z).
This concludes the proof. 
Now define g+i as the function obtained by applying the truncation lemma above with f = gi and γ = λ
∗
i .
Also define the truncated cost function g+ as g+(z) =
∑
i g
+
i (zi), and the truncated profit function pi
+ as
pi+(x) = 〈v, x〉 − g+(Sx).
We claim that pi+ satisfies all properties required by the lemma. First, it is discrete submodular: g+ is convex
and supermodular, since it is a sum of 1-dimensional convex functions, which are trivially supermodular; discrete
submodularity of pi+ then follows from Fact 2.7.
Moreover, we claim pi+ has the same value as pi over solutions in F |U◦
λ∗
. This follows from the fact that
every solution x in this family has ∇g(Sx) ≤ λ∗ (by Property (P1’)), and hence Claim B.1(iii) guarantees that
g(Sx) = g+(Sx).
Finally, we claim that pi+ is non-negative monotone. Since pi+(∅) = pi(∅) = 0, it again suffices to show
monotonicity. For that, Claim B.1(ii) guarantees that all solutions x ⊆ U ◦λ∗ now satisfy ∇g+(Sx) ≤ λ∗. The
proof of Lemma 4.4 then extends to show that pi+ is monotone. This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
B.3 Proof of Claim 5.2
Say A \ B = {i}. Then by supermodularity of the cost function g (Lemma 2.5) and the absence of exceptional
items,
pi(yA)− pi(yB) = viyi − (g(SyA)− g(SyB)) ≤ viyi − g(Siyi) ≤ pi(ei) ≤M.
For the lower bound, we also use the optimality of y.
pi(yA)− pi(yB) = viyi − (g(SyA)− g(SyB)) ≥ viyi − (g(SyU )− g(SyU\{i})) = pi(y)− pi(yU\{i}) ≥ 0,
where the middle inequality uses supermodularity of g, and the last one uses the optimality of y. This concludes
the proof.
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B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Part (b) was already proved in details, so we provide only a proof for part (a).
Let fopt′ = fopt(Uλ∗). Using Theorem 4.2 and the assumption that no item has profit more than opt/ηd, we
know fopt′ ≥ opt(U ◦λ∗) ≥ fopt2d+1 ≥ fopt3d . Let y be an optimal fractional solution for Uλ∗ , so that pi(y) = fopt′ ≥
fopt
3d . By downward-closedness ofF , yL is a feasible fractional solution only containing items in Lλ∗ . Therefore,
E[fopt(Lλ∗)] ≥ E[pi(yL)] = fopt′/2. Finally, using the concentration inequality of Fact A.9 with t = fopt/12d
(where the Lipschitz-type condition is satisfied due to Claim 5.2), we get
Pr
(∣∣∣∣pi(yL)− fopt′2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ fopt12d
)
≥ 1− 2M (fopt
′/2)
(fopt/12d)2
≥ 19
20
.
The last inequality follows usingM = optηd ≤ fopt104d . Hence, w.p. at least 19/20, fopt(Lλ∗) ≥ pi(yL) ≥ fopt
′
2 − fopt12d ≥
fopt
12d . This is at least
1
12d fopt(L) since L ⊂ U . Hence λ∗ is a candidate in the definition of µ, thus by maximality
µ ≥ λ∗, proving the part (a) of the lemma.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 5.6
Recall the definition of modified profit function pi+ from Lemma 4.5. Again, let E be the event that Lemmas 5.3
and 5.4 hold; by a union bound Pr[E ] ≥ 17/20. We claim that under this event, the functions pi+ and pi coincide
over feasible sets of R◦µ. Indeed, µ ≥ λ∗, so the elements R◦µ ⊆ Uλ∗ , and then Lemma 4.5(iii) tells us that pi+
and pi agree on all feasible subsets of Uλ∗ .
Using Assumption 5.1, the algorithm SubmodMS applied over R◦µ cannot distinguish between pi and pi+.
Thus, the solution X ∈ F returned by our algorithm using profit function pi is the same as one returned by
running algorithm SubmodMS over instance R◦µ with the non-negative monotone submodular function pi+.
This algorithm is α-competitive, and moreover conditioning on the sample still leaves the out-of-sample items in
random order, so the guarantee of the algorithm still holds. Hence,
E[pi(X) | E ] = E[pi+(X) | E ]
α-approx
≥ 1
α
E[opt(Rµ) | E ],
where the first equality follows from pi+ and pi agreeing on Rµ. Since we are assuming no item has large profit,
by Theorem 4.2, the integer optimum is at least a 1/(2d+1)-fraction of the fractional optimum,
1
α
E[opt(Rµ) | E ] ≥ 1
α(2d+ 1)
E[fopt(Rµ) | E ] ≥ fopt
200αd(2d+ 1)
,
the last inequality using that event E guarantees Lemma 5.4(c). Since the algorithm does not include items with
negative marginals, it always produces solutions with non-negative values. Therefore,
E[pi(X)] ≥ E[pi(X) | E ] Pr(E) ≥ opt
O(αd2)
.
The last inequality follows since Pr(E) is a constant. This concludes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Let x∗ be the optimal solution with value opt := pi(x∗) for the problem of maximizing profit with the supermod-
ular cost function g. Since our proof deals with fractional allocations, define v̂(·) to be the convex extension (or
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Lova´sz extension) of the submodular value function v(·) [Sch03]. Since v̂ is an extension of v, v(x) = v̂(x) for
all points x in the domain of v, i.e., for x ∈ {0, 1}n. Define for all x ∈ [0, 1]n,
pi(x) := v̂(x)− g(Sx).
Now,
pi(x∗/d) = v̂(x∗/d)− g(Sx∗/d) ≥ 1/d (v(x∗)− g(Sx∗)) = pi(x∗)/d = opt/d. (B.12)
The inequality uses that for the fractional point x∗/d, the Lova´sz extension value is v̂(x∗/d) = (1− 1/d) · v(∅) +
1/d · v(x∗), and that by Lemma 6.2(1), g(Sx∗/d) ≤ g(Sx∗).
So the separable problem has a good fractional solution x∗/d, and we want to “round” it to a near-integral
solution. Indeed, take the matroid polytope P corresponding to the matroid constraint F , and intersect P with
the subspace {x | Sx = S(x∗/d)}. Clearly x∗/d belongs to this intersection. Now consider maximizing the
linear function 〈∇v̂(x∗/d), x − x∗/d〉 over this polytope, and let x˜ be a basic feasible solution to this linear
optimization problem. Since at most d of the tight constraints come from the subspace restriction, the point x˜
lies on some face of the matroid polytope of dimension at most d. By [GRSZ14, Theorem 4.3], x˜ has at most 2d
fractional coordinates. Moreover, since x˜ is the maximizer of the linear function and x∗/d is a feasible point, the
inner product 〈∇v̂(x∗/d), x˜− x∗/d〉 ≥ 0. The convexity of the Lova´sz extension now implies v̂(x˜) ≥ v̂(x∗/d).
Because Sx˜ = Sx∗/d, the cost remains unchanged and we get
pi(x˜) ≥ pi(x∗/d) ≥ opt/d.
Let xint be the x˜ restricted to the integral coordinates, and let F ⊆ [n] be the set of fractional coordinates in
x˜. Then by subadditivity of the pi function, we get the following, where χe is an indicator vector of element e.
opt/d ≤ pi(x˜) ≤ pi(xint) +
∑
e∈F
pi(x˜e χe) (by subadditivity of pi)
≤ pi(xint) +
∑
i∈F
(
v̂(x˜e χe)− g(x˜e Sχe)
)
. (Definition of pi, and Lemma 6.2(2))
Moreover, for each individual item e,
v̂(x˜e χe)− g(x˜e Sχe) = x˜e v̂(χe)− g(x˜e Sχe) ≤ v̂(χe)− g(Sχe) = pi(χe).
The first equality above uses that the Lova´sz extension acts linearly on single items. The inequality follows since
there are no exceptional items and x˜e ∈ (0, 1). Hence, we get pi(xint) +
∑
e∈F pi(χe) ≥ opt/d.
We can use the algorithm for the separable problem (which is part of the theorem assumption) to find xsep with
value pi(xsep) ≥ (1/β)pi(xint). Using Lemma 6.2(2) again, pi(xsep) ≥ pi(xsep). Also, using the well-known 1/e-
approximation for the most profitable item returns an item e∗ with profit pi(χe∗) ≥ 1e·2d
∑
e∈F pi(χe). Returning
xsep with probability ββ+2ed and the single element ê otherwise gives expected value at least
1
β + 2ed
(
β pi(xsep) + 2ed pi(χe∗)
)
≥ 1
β + 2ed
(
pi(xint) +
∑
e∈F
pi(χe)
)
≥ opt
d(β + 2ed)
.
C Other Loose Ends
C.1 Conjugates over the Positive Orthant
The following lemma justifies why it is enough to consider only non-negative λs for our setting.
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Lemma C.1. Given a convex, non-decreasing, non-negative function g : Rd+ → R+, ∀z ∈ Rd+, we have
g(z) = maxλ∈Rd(〈λ, z〉 − g?(λ)) = maxλ∈Rd+(〈λ, z〉 − g
?(λ)).
Proof. Let ĝ be a function that is same as g on positive orthant and is∞ everywhere else. Then for λ ∈ Rd,
ĝ?(λ) = sup
z∈Rd
{〈λ, z〉 − ĝ(z)} = sup
z≥0
{〈λ, z〉 − ĝ(z)} = g?(max(λ, 0)).
Here, the first equality is by definition. The second is because ĝ(z) = ∞ if z is not non-negative. The third is
because if some coordinate of λ is negative, zeroing out the corresponding coordinate of z increases 〈λ, z〉 and
decreases ĝ(z), because ĝ is non-decreasing in positive orthant. Here vector max(λ, 0) is the coordinate-wise
maximum.
Now for any z ∈ Rd+, g(z) = ĝ(z) = maxλ∈Rd(〈λ, z〉 − ĝ?(λ)) = maxλ∈Rd(〈λ, z〉 − g?(max(λ, 0))) =
maxλ∈Rd+(〈λ, z〉 − g
?(λ)).
C.2 Removing Assumptions on the Elements
Let opt denote the profit of the optimal integer solution to the problem (2.3). To discharge the conditions on
elements in Assumption 3.1 we show the following reduction.
Lemma C.2. Suppose A is algorithm that works for instances that have no exceptional items, where each item
has profit pi(e) ≤ opt/ηd, and where items are in general position, that guarantees a profit of opt/β. Then we
can get another algorithm that requires none of these assumptions, and guarantees a profit of optO(β+ηd) .
Proof. The general position argument is simplest: we essentially need that for some fixed λ ∈ C, there is at most
one element such that v(e) = 〈λ, s(e)〉. This can be achieved by subtracting from each v(e) some random noise
picked uniformly from the interval [0, (δ/n)pi(e)] for some tiny δ; this can change the optimal profit most by a
(1− δ)-factor.
Recall that item e is called exceptional if arg maxθ∈[0,1]
{
θ v(e) − g(θ s(e))} is achieved at θ ∈ (0, 1): i.e.,
it is optimal to take a fraction of the item. E.g., in the 1-dimensional case, v(e) = s(e) = 1, and g(s) = 0.99s2.
The following claim is a minor variation of [BUCM12, Lemma 5.1]:
Claim C.3 (Few Exceptional Items). If g is supermodular, then any optimal solution contains at most d excep-
tional items.
Proof. Fix an optimal solution O∗, and for each i = 1, . . . , d, let oi := arg maxo∈O∗ s(o)i be an item for which
the ith-coordinate of the size vector is maximized. Let L denote the set of these “large” items. If O∗ contains
strictly more than d exceptional items, let o∗ ∈ O∗ be any exceptional item not in L, and let x′ := χO∗\{o∗} be
the characteristic vector for the elements in the optimal set without o∗. By construction, s(o∗) ≤ Sx′ component-
wise. Since o∗ is exceptional, v(o∗) < 〈∇g(s(o∗)), s(o∗)〉; moreover, the latter is at most 〈∇g(Sx′), s(o∗)〉 due
to g having monotone gradients. But this implies that dropping o∗ would increase the profit, which contradicts
our choice of O∗.
Moreover, since the profit function is subadditive, there can be at most ηd high-valued items. Now the
reduction procedure: with probability 12 run the single-item secretary problem (with competitive ratio 1/e), and
with the remaining probability run algorithmA . If the instance has a high-valued item then we get expected value
at least (1/e) · opt/(ηd). If not, divide the optimal solution x∗ into the solution restricted to the non-exceptional
items x1, and to the (at most d) exceptional items x2. By the subadditivity of the profit, pi(x∗) ≤ pi(x1) + pi(x2).
Again the secretary algorithm gives a 1/(de)-approximation for the profit pi(x2), so it suffices to get a good
approximation for the non-exceptional items.
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